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Abstract
We dene belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as se-
quential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best-replies, after every
history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set
of payos that includes all belief-free equilibrium payos. Conversely, any payo in the
interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payo.
Keywords: repeated game with incomplete information; Harsanyi doctrine; belief-free
equilibria.
JEL codes: C72, C73
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to characterize the set of payos that can be achieved by equilibria
that are robust to the specication of the beliefs. The games considered are two-player repeated
games with two-sided incomplete information and observable actions (with discounting). The
restriction we impose is that the players' equilibrium strategies be optimal independently of their
beliefs, from any history on. This concept is not new: it has been introduced in the context of
repeated games with imperfect private monitoring by Piccione (2002) and Ely and V alim aki
(2002) and further studied in Ely, H orner and Olszewski (2005). It is also related to the concept
of ex post equilibrium that is used in mechanism design (see Cr emer and McLean, 1985) and in
large nite games (see Kalai, 2004).
To predict players' behavior in games with unknown parameters, a model typically includes
the specication of the players' subjective probability distributions over these unknowns, follow-
ing Harsanyi (1967). This is not necessary when belief-free equilibria are considered. Just as
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1ex post equilibria, belief-free equilibria enjoy the desirable property that the beliefs about the
underlying uncertainty are irrelevant. Indeed, players' beliefs need not be derived by Bayes' rule
from a common prior. Further, the way in which players update their beliefs as the game unfolds
is irrelevant.
Therefore, while solving for belief-free equilibria requires the game to be fully specied, it
does not require that all players know all the parameters of the model. In this sense, this idea is
close to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)'s original motivation as they introduced \games of
incomplete information", as games in which some parameters remain unspecied. Such equilibria
are also consistent with misperceptions, as dened by Luce and Raia (1957). Nevertheless, as
in the case of games with perfect information, players are expected utility maximizers: players
are allowed to randomize, and take expectations with respect to such mixtures when evaluating
their payo. Our purpose is to characterize what equilibria do not require any probabilistic
sophistication beyond the one assumed in repeated games with perfect information. Belief-free
equilibria are sequential equilibria (for any prior) satisfying any potentially desirable renement.
In fact, in a belief-free equilibrium, the players' strategies must be a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium of the game of complete information that is consistent with their private information.
However, we do not view belief-free equilibrium as an equilibrium renement per se. In fact,
belief-free equilibria need not exist. The robustness that is demanded is extreme in the sense
that we do not require simply that such an equilibrium remains an equilibrium for beliefs close to
some particular specication, but for all possible beliefs. Also, the order of quantiers matters.
It may be that a particular payo vector is an equilibrium payo vector for all possible beliefs,
but that the particular equilibrium attaining it depends on the beliefs. Our requirement is that
the same strategy prole be optimal for all possible beliefs.
We provide a set of necessary conditions that belief-free equilibrium payos must satisfy
which denes a closed convex set, possibly empty. Conversely, we prove that every interior point
of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payo, provided that players are suciently patient.
This set of payos turns out to play a prominent role in the literature on Nash equilibria
in games with one-sided incomplete information. Shalev (1994) considers the case of private
values (the uninformed player knows his own payos) and shows that the set of uniform (undis-
counted) Nash equilibrium payos can be derived from this set. Closest to our analysis is Cripps
and Thomas (2003) which considers the one-sided case with private values as well, but with
discounting. Most relevant here is their Theorem 2, in which they show that the payos in
the strict interior of this set are Nash equilibria for all priors. In general, however, the set of
Nash equilibrium payos is larger, as they demonstrate in their Theorem 3 which establishes
a folk theorem. Forges and Minelli (1997) is also related. They show how communication can
signicantly simplify the construction of strategies that achieve the Nash equilibrium payos.
These simple strategies also appear in Koren (1988). The most general characterization of Nash
equilibrium payos remains Hart (1985) for the case of one-sided incomplete information. A
survey is provided by Forges (1992).
The assumptions of Bayesianism has already been `relaxed' in several papers. Ba~ nos (1968)
2and Megiddo (1980) show that strategies exist that asymptotically allow a player to secure what
he could secure in the game with complete information. Milnor (1954) review several alternative
criteria and discuss their relative merits. The topic has also been explored in computer science.
Aghassi and Bertsimas (2006) use robust optimization techniques to provide an alternative con-
cept in the case of bounded payo uncertainty. Monderer and Tennenholtz (1999) study the
asymptotic eciency in the case in which players are non-Bayesian and monitoring is imperfect.
All these papers either oer an alternative equilibrium concept, or study what is asymptotically
achievable without using any solution concept. Yet the strategy proles that are characterized
in these papers are not Bayesian Nash equilibria (at least under discounting), which is a major
dierence with our paper.
As mentioned, the concept of belief-free equilibria has already been introduced in the context
of games with complete but imperfect information. There, the restriction on the equilibrium
pertains to the private history observed by the opponent. In both contexts, the characterization
of equilibrium payos is very tractable, although these characterizations are quite dierent.
A criticism that has been sometimes raised about non-trivial belief-free equilibria under im-
perfect monitoring is that they involve randomization: players are (at least periodically) indif-
ferent across continuation strategies. This is not the case under incomplete information. In the
equilibrium that we construct, randomization is only called for inasmuch as achieving an exact
payo requires it, and inasmuch the minmax strategies may require it. (That is, randomization
is used for traditional reasons.)
The next section introduces the two necessary conditions. A leading example is introduced, for
which these conditions are explicitly worked out. Section three provides the theorem, and gives
a relatively short proof using explicit communication. The proof without such communication is
given in Appendix. Section four applies our logic to another example, a game of bad reputation
introduced by Ely and V alim aki (2003).
2 The model
We consider repeated games with (two-sided) incomplete information, as dened by Harsanyi
(1967-68) and Aumann and Maschler (1995). There is an J  K array of 2-person games in
normal form. The number of actions of Player i = 1;2 is the same across all J  K games.
Player 1 is told in which row the true game lies but he is not told which of the games in that row
is actually being played. Player 2 is told in which column the true game lies but he is not told
which of the games in that column is the true game. Players observe all actions, but not their
payos. More formally, the stage-game is a nite-action game. Let A1 and A2 be the nite sets
of actions for Player 1 and 2 respectively, where Ai has at least two elements. Let A = A1 A2.
When the row is j and the column is k -for short, when the state is (j;k)-, Player i's reward
function is denoted u
jk
i , for i = 1;2. We extend the domain of u
jk
i from pure action proles


















Let M := maxju
jk
i (a)j, where the maximum is taken over players i = 1;2, states j = 1;:::;J,
k = 1;:::;K, and action proles a 2 A.
Example 1 (Prisoner's dilemma with one-sided incomplete information) Player 1
is informed of the true state (= the row), Player 2 is not, and there is only one column (J = 2,
K = 1). If the true game corresponds to j = 1, payos are given (in every period) by the
prisoner's dilemma payo matrix in which T is \Cooperate" and B is \Defect". If the true game
corresponds to j = 2, payos are given by the prisoner's dilemma payo matrix in which B is
\Cooperate" and T is \Defect". The payos in the rst case are
T B
T 1;1  L;1 + G
B 1 + G; L 0;0
and in the second state are
T B
T 0;0 1 + G; L
B  L;1 + G 1;1
As usual, we maintain the assumption that cooperation is ecient: L   G >  1.
We consider the repeated game between the two players. Players select an action in each
period t = 1;2;:::. Actions are observable, realized rewards are not.
Let Ht = (A1  A2)
t 1 be the set of all possible histories of actions ht up to and including
period t. A (behavioral) strategy for row j, or type j, of Player 1 (resp. type k of Player




































Consider the game of complete information given state (j;k). Given the common discount
factor  < 1, player i's payo in this game is the average discounted sum of expected rewards.
A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game is dened as usual.
Our purpose is to characterize the payos that can be achieved, with low discounting, by
a special class of sequential equilibria. In a belief-free equilibrium, each player's continuation
strategy, after any history, is a best-reply to his opponent's continuation strategy, independently
of his beliefs about the state of the world, and therefore, independently of his opponent type.
Such equilibria are trivially sequential equilibria that satisfy any belief-based requirement. At the
same time, they do not require players to be Bayesian, or to share a common prior. Because they
are belief-free, they must in particular induce a subgame-perfect equilibrium in every complete
information game that is consistent with the player's private information.
















and discount factor .
As mentioned, belief-free equilibria have been previously introduced in and applied to games
with imperfect private monitoring. With incomplete information but observable actions, there
is no need for randomization on the equilibrium path. Indeed, in our construction, along the
equilibrium path, players always have a strict preference to play some particular action. Of
course, this action potentially depends on a player's private information (and on the history). In
our construction, randomization only appears during punishment phases, as is standard in folk
theorems that do allow for mixed strategies to determine minmax payos, as we do.
A belief-free equilibrium (s1;s2) determines, for each Player i; a J  K array of equilibrium
payos v
jk
i . Consider i = 1. Conditional on the column k he is being told, Player 2 knows that








Because the equilibrium is belief-free, Player 1's payo must be individually rational in the
special case in which his beliefs are degenerate on the true column k. This means that, for a
given k, Player 2's strategy sk
2 is such that Player 1 cannot gain from deviating from s
j
1, for all
j = 1;:::;J. The existence of such a strategy sk
2 puts a restriction on how low Player 1's payo
v
jk
1 can be (in fact, a joint restriction on the vector vk
1).
If J = 1, so that the game is of one-sided incomplete information, this requirement on Player
1's payo is weak: for each k, Player 1 must receive at least as much as his minmax payo
(in mixed strategies) in the true game being played. In general however, this is a stringent
restriction, as it implies that the set of belief-free equilibria is empty for some games.
Example 2: (Non-existence of belief free equilibria) Player 1 is informed of the true state








For each state, Player 2 must be guaranteed to get at least 0 in a belief-free equilibrium: his
equilibrium strategy must be optimal given any beliefs he may have, including degenerate beliefs
on the true state. His payo must therefore be at least as large as his minimax payo given the
true state, which exceed 0 in both states. This implies that the action prole yielding  4 to
5Player 2 cannot be played more than a fth of the time in equilibrium. Equivalently, this means
that Player 1 equilibrium payo is at most 14=5 in each state. However, if Player 1 randomizes
between U and D independently of the state, he is guaranteed to get at least 3 in one of the
states, a contradiction. [This state will typically depend on Player 2's strategy. However, no
strategy of Player 2 can bring down Player 1's payo below 3 in both states simultaneously.]
While the previous example shows that belief-free equilibria need not exist, it is perhaps
surprising that they can exist in games that are dominance solvable, as opposed to ex post
equilibrium. Indeed, the game of Example 1 is dominance solvable, yet the set of belief-free
equilibria is non-empty, as we shall see.
Note that these minmax levels are vectors, not scalars: punishing severely Player 1 in one
row may require leaving him a high payo in another row. Computing these minmax levels
is in general tedious. Fortunately, this is precisely the content of Blackwell's (1968) result on
approachability.
For a given p 2 4f1;:::;Jg (resp. q 2 4f1;:::;Kg), let bk
1(p) (resp. b
j
2(q)) be the value for
Player 1 (resp. Player 2) of the one shot game with payo matrix p  uk
1 (resp. q  u
j
2). We say






























. Approachability can be used to show that, if v1 2 RJK is individually
rational for Player 1, then for any column k, Player 2 has a strategy ^ sk
2 (referred to as a punish-
ment strategy thereafter) such that Player 1's average payo cannot be larger than v
jk
1 for all j
independently of the strategy he uses. (Obviously, an analogous statement holds for Player 2).
[Approachability is usually dened for payos evaluated according to the limit of means rather
than discounting, but the uniform versions of the results that we will use imply the respective
counterparts for discounting, provided the discount factor is close enough to one. See Cripps and
Thomas (2003) for details on the issue of discounting.]
Necessary condition 1 (Individual Rationality): If there exists  < 1 such that vi is a
belief-free equilibrium payo array for all  > , then vi is individually rational.
We apply approachability to compute these minmax levels in our rst example.
Example (Prisoner's dilemma with one-sided incomplete information, continued)
It is shown in Appendix that, in the prisoner's dilemma described above, (v1
1;v2
1) is a minmax





















1  0; v
2
1  0:




































when G > L: See Figure 1.
Note that in this example, individual rationality for Player 2 is straightforward. Because the
equilibrium is belief-free, Player 2's payo must be individually rational in the special case in
which his beliefs are degenerate on the true column j. In particular, for each row j, Player 1 has
one punishment strategy s
j
1 which guarantees that, independently of Player 2's strategy, Player
2's payo is at most 0. Therefore a payo v2 = (v0
2;v1








Figure 1: Player 1's individually rational payos






















1 + G 1 + G
1 + G
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In a belief-free equilibrium, play may depend on a player's private information. That is,
Player 1's equilibrium strategy s
j
1 typically depends on the row j he is told, and Player 2's
strategy sk
2 on the row k he is told. Since Player 1's strategy s
j
1 must be a best-reply to s2
independently of his beliefs, it must be a best-reply to sk
2, that is, when he assigns probability
one to the true column k. In particular, s
j
1 must be a better-reply to sk
2 than s
j0
1 , j0 6= j, when the
row is j. While this is a seemingly weaker condition than the rst one, it is not implied by the
previous condition, since this one imposes a constraint on the play on the \equilibrium path".
By deviating to s
j0
1 when the state is (j;k), Player 1 induces the same distribution over action
proles than the one generating the payo v
j0k
1 in state (j0;k), which imposes restriction on the
equilibrium strategies.







8induces a distribution fPrfa j (j;k)g : a 2 Agj;k over action proles, where:

































Necessary Condition 2 (Incentive Compatibility): If (v1;v2) is a pair of belief-free





























If such distributions exist, we say that (v1;v2) is incentive compatible. Incentive compatible
payos always exist, since the constraints are satised if Prfa j (j;k)g is independent of (j;k).
However, not every pair of payo arrays is incentive compatible.
Example: (Prisoner's Dilemma with one-sided incomplete information, contin-
ued)











TB) such that 1
TT  0; 2
BB  0; 
j
BT  0; 
j




BT  1; 2
BB + 2
BT + 2





























































BT (1 + G)   
2
TBL:
For each player, we may characterize the set of payo arrays that are incentive compatible and,
in addition, satisfy individual rationality for the other player - a constraint that is necessary for
equilibrium. We only describe the resulting set V IC
i in some detail for Player 1, and display
the sets for both players in Figures 2 and 3. In either case, the problem is a standard (nite-
dimensional) optimization problem. Observe that, when G > L, this problem is not linear for
Player 2, as the set of Player 1's individual rational payos is not a polytope.
Recall that, in the prisoner's dilemma, a player cannot get more than 1 + G=(1 + L) if
his opponent is guaranteed at least 0. Therefore, v
j
1  1 + G=(1 + L); j = 1;2. The point
(1 + G=(1 + L);1 + G=(1 + L)) is obtained by setting 1
TT = 1   1
TB = 2
BB = 1   2
BT =





TB = 1   2
BB = 1=(1 + L). Further extreme points depend on the value of L   G :
9(i) if L   G  1, we get the point
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Figure 2: Incentive compatible payos for Player 1
(for some individually rational payos for Player 2)
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Figure 3: Set of Player 2's payos
(for some individually rational and incentive compatible payos for Player 1)
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3 The Main Result
Let V  denote the feasible set of pairs of payo arrays satisfying conditions 1 and 2. It is clear
that V  is convex. We prove that:
Theorem Fix some v in the interior of V . The pair of payo arrays v is achieved in some
belief-free equilibrium if players are suciently patient.
This theorem establishes that the necessary conditions are `almost' sucient. It is then
natural to ask whether we can get an exact characterization. The strict inequalities corresponding
to individual rationality cannot be weakened, in general. One (but not the only) reason for this is
that our optimality criterion involves discounting, while Blackwell's result is for the undiscounted
case. The strict inequalities corresponding to incentive compatibility may be weakened when V 
11has nonempty interior. It then suces that, if v 2 V  and some incentive compatibility for Player
1, say, binds at v (and nothing else binds), we can nd v0 2 V  such that v0





for all (j;k). However, for the interesting case in which V  has empty interior, this may not be
possible. Consider for instance the case of one-sided incomplete information; Player 1 knows the
row, but his payo does not depend on the row, so that the incentive compatibility constraints
necessarily bind. A diculty is then to induce Player 1 to play the minmaxing strategy after a
deviation by Player 2 that is appropriate given the true row. Because there is no possibility to
provide strict incentives for `truthtelling' after the punishment phase, it is then necessary that
the punishment strategy itself be incentive compatible, which reduces the scope for punishment,
and changes the relevant individual rationality constraints.
Figure 4 and 5 display the resulting equilibrium payos in the prisoner's dilemma. Observe
however, that these are the projections of belief-free equilibrium payo pairs onto each player's
payo space. It is not true that any pair of vectors selected from these projections is a pair of






Figure 4: Belief-free equilibrium payos for Player 1 as  ! 1
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The proof of the theorem is constructive. A natural way to proceed would be to follow Koren
(1988) and others. First, players signal their type (through their choice of actions). Given the
reported types, players then choose actions so as to generate the distribution over action proles
corresponding to these reports. If a player deviates in this second phase, he is minmaxed.
Individual rationality guarantees that deviating after some report yields a lower payo than
equilibrium play does, independently of the state. Incentive compatibility ensures that truthful
reporting is optimal.
However, such strategies typically fail to be sequentially rational: minmaxing forever one's
opponent need not be individual rational. While this issue can be addressed with standard
modications, a more serious diculty is that the resulting strategy prole still fails to be belief-
free. In particular, if a player believes that the reported type is incorrect, following his prescribed
continuation strategy is no longer individually rational.
The actual construction is therefore more involved, to ensure that beliefs are irrelevant after
13every possible history. To simplify exposition, we assume here that there is a public randomiza-
tion device and that players can communicate at no cost in every period. These assumptions
are dropped in the proof in Appendix. So suppose that, at the beginning of each period, a draw
from the uniform distribution on the unit interval (independent of the state of nature and over
time) is publicly observed. And suppose that, at the beginning of the game (before the rst draw
is realized) and at the end of every period, players simultaneously make a report that is publicly
observable. The set of possible reports is the set of rows and columns, respectively: Player 1
reports some j0 = 1;:::;J, while Player 2 reports some k0 = 1;:::;K.
In every period, and using the most recent outcome of the randomization device as a corre-
lation device, a correlated action prole is played that only depends on the last pair of reports
made by the players. These correlated action proles are such that each player obtains the
desired payo whenever (j0;k0) = (j;k), i.e. whenever reports are correct, and that this payo
exceeds what can be obtained by misreporting, independently of the type truthfully reported by
the opponent. Thus, players are willing to report their type truthfully, regardless of their beliefs.
In case a player deviates from the prescribed action, he is then punished for nitely many peri-
ods. Making sure that play during such a punishment phase is also belief-free introduces some
additional complications.
Because players report their types innitely often, a player who believes that his opponent's
report is incorrect still expects his opponent to revert to the true report in the next period. As
a consequence, it is less costly for him to play for one period according to the report that he
believes to be false, than to deviate and to face a long punishment phase.
More formally, given some v 2 int V , we rst describe the equilibrium strategies, and then
check that these strategies (i) achieve v, (ii) are best-replies that are belief-free.
Equilibrium Strategies:
The play can be divided in phases, which are similar to states of an automaton. There are
two kinds of phases. Regular phases last one period. Punishment phases can last from 1 to T
periods, where T is to be specied. Regular phases are denoted Rjk ("1;"2) where "1;"2 2 R.





(i) Regular phase: In a regular phase Rjk ("1;"2), actions are determined by the outcome














and vi(R("1;"2)) := fv
jk
i (Rjk ("1;"2))g(j;k), these probabilities, along with some number  " > 0,
are chosen such that
























for all i = 1;2, "i;"0
i 2 [  ";  "], j0 6= j, k0 6= k. This is possible for all suciently small  " by
incentive compatibility, given that v 2 int V .
At the end of a regular phase, types are reported truthfully.
(ii) Punishment phase: The punishment phase lasts at most T periods. Without loss of
generality, we describe here the actions and reports in phase P k
1 . Decreasing  " if necessary, the
(behavior) strategy b sk
2 of Player 2 during the punishment phase P k
1 is such that, for some   < 1
and all discount factors  >  , the average discounted payo of Player 1 over the T periods,
conditional on state (j;k) is no larger than v
jk
1   2 ". This is possible for all suciently large T
by individual rationality, given that v 2 int V .
We further assume that T,  , and  " satisfy, for all j;k, and i = 1;2,
 (1   )M + (v
jk
i    ") > (1   )M + ((1   
T)(v
jk
i   2 ") + 
T(v
jk










i   2 "=3): (4)
To see that such T,   and  " exist, observe that, for a xed but small enough  " > 0, (3) is
satised for all T large enough and  >   for   close enough to one. Increasing the value of   if
necessary, (4) is then satised as well.
Returning to the specication of actions and reports, as long as the punishment phase P k
1
lasts (i.e. for at most T periods), Player 2 plays according to b sk
2 (given k and the history starting
in the initial period of P k
1 ). Observe that b sk




2, conditional on the true column being k. Without loss of generality, we pick s
jk
1 to be pure.
Observe that s
jk
1 may depend on j.
Players report truthfully types in all periods of the punishment phase.
Initial phase: As mentioned, players report types at the beginning of the game. These initial
reports are made truthfully. The initial phase is the regular phase Rjk (0;0), where (j;k) are the
initial reports.
Transitions:
(i) From a regular phase Rjk ("1;"2): if the action of Player 1 (respectively, Player 2) diers
from the prescribed action, while Player 2 (resp. 1) plays the prescribed action, then the next
phase is P k0
1 (resp. P
j0
2 ), where k0 (resp. j0) is the report made at the end of the period by the
corresponding player. [Observe that the message of the deviator plays no role here.] Otherwise:
(i) if (j0;k0) = (j;k) or both j 6= j0 and k 6= k0, the next phase is Rj0k0 ("1;"2), where (j0;k0) is the
pair of messages in the period, (ii) if j 6= j0 and k = k0 (resp. j = j0and k 6= k0), the next phase
is Rj0k0 (  ";"2) (resp. Rj0k0 ("1;  ")). In words, unilateral deviations from the prescribed action
15prole trigger a punishment phase, while inconsistencies in successive reports are punished via
the payo prescribed by the regular phase. Simultaneous deviations are ignored.
(ii) From a punishment phase: without loss of generality, consider P k
1 , where k is Player 2's
report at the end of the last period before the punishment phase (so k is xed throughout P k
1 ). In
what follows, all statements to histories and periods refer to the partial histories starting at the
beginning of the punishment phase. Given b sk
2, dene Hk  HT as the set of histories of length
at most T for which there exists an (arbitrary) strategy s1 of Player 1 such that this history is
on the equilibrium path for s1 and b sk
2, as far as actions are concerned. That is, a history is not
in Hk if and only if, in some period, the action of Player 2 is inconsistent with b sk
2.
If ht 2 Hk but ht+1 62 Hk, the punishment phase stops at the end of period t + 1 and
the punishment phase P
j0
2 , starts, where j0 is Player 1's report in period t + 1. Otherwise, the
punishment phase continues up to the T-th period, and we let henceforth h denote such a history
of length T. Let (j0;k0) denote the pair of reports in the last period of the punishment phase.
The next phase is then Rj0k0("1(h;P k
1 );"2(h;P k
1 )), with "1(h;P k
1 ) 2 [  ";0], "1(h;P k
1 ) =   " if





is such that, if k0 6= k, playing the action specied in the punishment
phase is optimal for Player 1 along every history h 2 Hk under the state of the world (j0;k0)











in [  ";0] for











is such that, conditional on state (j0;k0) and after every history h0 2 Hk within
the punishment phase, Player 2 is indierent over all sequences over action proles (within the
punishment phase) consistent with Hk, and prefers those to all others; given (4), this is possible
whether k0 = k or not.
It is clear that the strategy prole yields the pair of payo arrays v=(v1;v2). It is equally
clear that play is specied in a way that is independent of beliefs.
Verication that the described strategy prole is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Regular phase Rjk ("1;"2): (i) actions: suppose that one player, say Player 1, unilaterally
deviates from the prescribed action prole. Then the punishment phase P k0
1 starts, where k0 is
the announcement by Player 2. Accordingly, the payo from deviating is at most equal to the
right-hand side of (3), while the payo from following the prescribed strategy is at least the left-
hand side of (3). The result follows. (ii) messages: (a) assume rst that Player 1 has deviated
from the recommended action prole, while Player 2 has not. Because Player 2 will correctly
report the column k at the end of the punishment phase P k0
1 that starts, he will get at most
(1 T)M+T(v
jk
i   "=3) by announcing k0 6= k, while he gets at least  (1 T)M+T(v
jk
i + "=3)
if he announces k0 = k, so that Player 2 has a strict incentive to report truthfully given (4). Given
1See H orner and Olszewski (2006) for the details of an analogous specication.
16that Player 1 has deviated, Player 1's report is irrelevant, and so it is also optimal for Player
1 to report truthfully; (b) otherwise, if Player i (say Player 2) reports the true state he gets at
least v
jk
i    ", while if he misreports, he gets at most (1   )maxk0 v
jk
i (Rjk0 ( ";  ")) + (v
jk
i    ").
Therefore, (2) guarantees that neither player has an incentive to deviate. Note that whenever
Player i's reports contradicts his previous report, his continuation payo will be at most v
jk
i    ",
ensuring that no player benets from misreporting his type.
Punishment phase: without loss of generality, consider P k
1 . (i) Messages: Observe rst
that all the messages in the punishment phase are irrelevant, except in the last period of this
punishment phase, whether this occurs after T periods or before. If such a history belongs to
Hk, then truthful announcements are optimal because of (2), as in case (ii-b) above; if such a
history does not belong to Hk, then truthful announcements are also optimal as the situation is
identical to the one described just above (case (ii-a)). (ii) Actions: the inequality (4) (for i = 2)
along with (6) ensures that he has no incentive to take an action outside of the support of the
(possibly mixed) action specied by b sk
2 after every history h 2 Hk, and that he is indierent over
all the actions within this support (whether his report k is correct or not); as for Player 1, by
denition his strategy is optimal in case k is the true column, and (5) guarantees that it remains
optimal to play according to s
jk
1 in state (j;k0), for all j;k0.
4 An example from Ely and V alim aki (2004)
Consider the example of Ely and V alim aki (2004) with two-long run players. Player 1 is informed
or the row, his type G or B, at the beginning of the game. In every period, there are two possible
states of the world, not to be confused with the row: these states, e and t are realizations of
random variables drawn independently and identically over time. In every period, both states are
equally likely. The realizations are observed by Player 1, but not by Player 2. Player 1 has two
actions, e and t, which stand forengine replacement and tune-up, respectively. In every period,
Player 2 can choose to stay out, in which case both players get a payo of zero, independently
of the state and row, or trade, in which case the payo depends both on the action of Player 1









That is, Player 1's type G and Player 2 have the same preferences: matching action and state,
while Player 1's type B prefers one action to the other independently of the state.
17We can easily adapt our proof to encompass such a set-up. We restrict attention to the case
in which trade takes place in virtually all periods. Our purpose is to study which payos are
belief-free equilibria with respect to the type of Player 1. We have in mind a situation in which
there is sucient statistical evidence for Player 2 to treat the law of the i.i.d. state as objective
uncertainty. In other applications, it may make more sense to require that the equilibrium be
belief-free with respect to the evolving state (or both). In this application, there is no belief-
free equilibrium payo if we insist that the restriction be relative to both kinds of uncertainties
simultaneously, as long as w > u.
We dene two probabilities B and G, that correspond (approximately) to the fraction of
time Player 1's bad type and good type perform engine replacements (Player 2 trades almost
always, as we will argue). Incentive compatibility requires that:
V
G
1 := u  




   (u + w) > u  








B (u + w)   w > 
G (u + w)   w (Player 1's type B).
Assuming that Player 1's bad type matches action and state whenever possible given B (as does
the good type), individual rationality further requires:
u  




   (u + w) > 0 and 
B (u + w)   w > 0.
The rst inequality guarantees that it is individually rational for Player 2 to trade with Player
1's bad type, and implies (given incentive compatibility) that it is also individually rational for
him to do so with a good type (and that it is also individually rational for Player 1's good type to
follow his equilibrium strategy). The second inequality guarantees that it is individually rational





















The corresponding set of probabilities

G;B	
is non-empty if and only if 3u > w, which
we assume from now on (observe that in this example, non-existence in the case 3u < w is not
driven by individual rationality or incentive compatibility per se, but by their conjunction). It is
then immediate to characterize the belief-free equilibrium payos. The probabilities and payos








































































. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . .
. . .
. .
Figure 6: Equilibrium frequencies and payos
The reader can probably guess how a full construction in this example (which does not t
the assumptions of the theorem, because of the changing state) would go, along the lines of
the construction underpinning the proof (we omit the details): the play is divided in phases of
length T, at the beginning of which Player 1 signals his type, and in which he is then supposed to
replace engine a number of times equal (to the nearest integer close) to BT, or GT, depending
on the signal he sent. If he does so in a way that matches the state of the world as often as









 as T ! 1. In order to guarantee that Player 1's bad type is
indeed willing to match the state of the world rather than replace engines as soon and as often
as he is allowed within a phase, it is necessary that he be punished at the end of the phase
by an amount proportional to the timing of the observed replacement: as  ! 1, the maximal
necessary punishment tends to zero. To enforce the punishment, players can agree, using a public
randomization device, on a period in which no trade takes place, at the end of the phase, in a
way that gives exactly the right punishment (the device can be dispensed with). It is also clear
how each player can secure zero and drive down his opponent's payo to zero, so there is no need
to elaborate on the way punishments for observable deviations are enforced.
195 Conclusion
We have studied belief-free equilibria in two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete
information under discounting. In a belief-free equilibrium, players' strategies are best-replies
after every history regardless of a player's belief about his opponent's type. Hence, these equi-
libria are robust to all specications of prior beliefs and updating rules. We show that, when
players are suciently patient, any payo that is (strictly) incentive compatible and individually
rational can by achieved with a belief free equilibrium. Conversely, the payo in a belief free
equilibrium must be incentive compatible and individually rational. One question that remains
open is a precise characterization of those games for which belief-free equilibria do not exist. We
provide examples to show how to actually determine these payo sets, and describe an extension
to a game with i.i.d. shocks.
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21Appendix: Proof of the main theorem
We rst explain the construction without explicit communication, but with a randomization
device. Communication is replaced by choices of actions, but since the set of actions may be
smaller than the set of states, it may be necessary to use several periods to report types. We
let c   1 denote the smallest such number given the number of states and actions, i.e. c is the
smallest integer such that jA1j
c 1  J and jA2j
c 1  K (recall that jAij  2). Players will
regularly report their type in rounds of c periods. For reasons that will become clear, in the last
of these c periods, players have the opportunity, through the choice of a specic action, to signal
that the report that they have just made is incorrect.
Equilibrium Strategies:
The play is again divided in phases. To guarantee that players' best-replies are independent of
their beliefs, even within a round of communication (especially if a player's own deviation during
that round already prevents him from truthfully reporting his type), the construction must be
considerably rened. For each player, we pick two specic actions from Ai, henceforth referred
to as B and U. The pair of payo arrays v is in the interior of V  and is xed throughout.
There are two kinds of phases. Regular phases last at most n periods, and punishments
phases last at most T periods, where n and T are to be specied. Regular phases are denoted



























(L stands for `Lie'). Punishment phases are denoted Pi, i = 1;2. Let b sk
2 (resp. b s
j
1) denote a
(behavior) strategy of Player 2 (resp. 1) such that Player 1's (resp. Player 2 's) payo be less
than v
jk
1   3 " for all j and all strategies of Player 1 (resp. v
jk
2   3 " for all k and all strategies of





2 ) denote some xed pure best-reply to b sk
2 (resp. b s
j
1 ) given row j (resp. column
k).
In several steps of the construction, a communication round of c periods takes place (within
a phase). We x a 1-1 mapping from states f1;:::;Jg to J sequences fat
1g
c 1
t=1 of length c   1
(at
1 2 A1) and similarly a 1-1 mapping from states K to jKj sequences fat
2g
c 1
t=1 of length c   1
(at
2 2 A2). If the play of Player 1 during the rst c   1 periods equals such a sequence, and
his action in period c equals B, we say that Player 1 (or his play) reports the row j that maps
into this sequence of actions. Similarly, if the play of Player 2 during the rst c   1 periods
equals such a sequence, and his action in period c equals B, we say that Player 2 (or his play)
reports the column k that maps into this sequence of actions. Otherwise, we say that Player i





, where U is the number of periods during these c periods in
which Player i chose action U. We shall provide incentives for Player i to report the true row












i  0 rather
than the incorrect row or column. Further, we provide incentives for Player i to maximize this
22number nU
i as soon as his sequence of actions fat
1g

t=1,   c   1 is inconsistent with any of the
sequences that the mapping maps into.
Actions:
(i) Regular phase: A regular phase lasts at most n > c periods, the last c of which being
a communication round. During the rst n   c periods, play proceed as follows, for all regular
phases indexed by j;k and true column k0:
Phase: Player 1 Player 2
R
j(L;nU












2 ) (U;:::;U) (U;:::;U)
The specication for R(L;nU
1 )k is the obvious analogue to the case R
j(L;nU
2 ). The action




2 are the same as in the punishment phase
(note that the duration is not the same, however). The superscript jk0 of the expression s
jk0
2
refers to the row j that indexes the regular phase R
j(L;nU
2 )(which need not be the true row) and
to the true column k0. This specication of actions is valid as long as (in case of Rjk ("1;"2) or
R(L;nU
1 )(L;nU
2 )) the history within the phase is consistent with these actions, or if all deviations
from the specied actions during this phase were simultaneous, and as long as (in case of R
j(L;nU
2 ))
the history within the phase is consistent with b s
j
1 for some arbitrary s2: as will be specied, a
punishment phase is immediately entered otherwise. During the periods n   c + 1;:::;n   1 of
this phase, Player 1 (resp. Player 2) communicates the true row j (resp. true column k); if this
is impossible given his play from period n   c onward, he chooses U in every remaining period.
(ii) Punishment phase: Without loss of generality, consider P1, where T > 2c is to be specied.
In the rst c periods of this phase, Player 1 plays U repeatedly while Player 2 reports the true
column (following the protocol described above). As in the regular phase, if this is impossible
given Player 2's play, he chooses U in every remaining period of this communication round. In







refers to any other case, where nU
i is the number of times Player i chose action U
in periods 1;:::;c. Play in periods c + 1;:::;T   c is then as follows.




















: as long as both players
have played U in all periods since period c + 1 or all deviations have been simultaneous, or (ii)
23in case k: as long as the history since period c + 1 is consistent with b sk
2 for some strategy s1;
otherwise, a new punishment phase is immediately entered (see below). Here, j0 refers to the
true row privately known to Player 1.
In the last c periods of a punishment phase (assuming that the specication above remained
valid up to period T   c), a communication round takes place, i.e. players report the true row
and column, and as soon as they fail to do so, play U repeatedly.
Initial Phase: In the rst c periods of the game, a communication round takes place, i.e.
players report the true row and column, and as soon as they fail to do so, play U repeatedly. In
period c + 1, the regular phase Rjk ("1;"2) is entered if row j and column k are reported, where
"i 2 [  ";  "] is chosen so that the ex ante payo in period 1 is exactly vjk conditional on j and






c periods, the regular phase R
j(L;nU






Player 2 reports k, regular phase R(L;nU
2 )k is entered. Regular phase R(L;nU
1 );(L;nU
2 ) is entered in
the remaining case.
Transitions:
From a regular phase: We have already mentioned what happens if there is a deviation
during the rst n c periods of such a phase: if a player makes a unilateral deviation during the
rst n   c periods of a regular phase Rjk ("1;"2) or R(L;nU
1 )(L;nU
2 ), a punishment phase starts: if
Player 1 (Player 2) unilaterally deviates, punishment phase P1 (resp. P2) is immediately entered.
Similarly, if Player 1 (resp. Player 2) deviates from b s
j
1 (resp. b sk
2) during the rst n   c periods
of a regular phase R
j(L;nU
2 ) (resp. R(L;nU
2 )k), the punishment phase P1 (resp. P2) is immediately
entered. From now on, we assume without repeating it that no such deviation occurs.
(i) from Rjk ("1;"2): the new phase depends on the last c periods of the phase. Dene also
 := 2(1   ) max(n;T)M. The quantity ~ "
jk
i will be dened shortly. In all tables that follow,
j0 6= j, k0 6= k. We have:
Regular Phase:
During periods n   c + 1,..., n of the phase,




























Rjk ("1;"2) j;k0 Rjk0 ("1;  ")
Rjk ("1;"2) j0;k0 Rj0k0 ("1;"2)
Rjk ("1;"2) j;k Rjk ("1;"2)














During periods n   c + 1,..., n of the phase,
















































1 )k j;k0 Rjk0 
"
k;k0





and symmetrically from R
j(L;nU
2 ). Where "
k;k
2 (h) 2 [3 "=4;  "], "
k;k0
2 (h) 2 [  "=2;  "=4], and
"
k;k0
1 (h) 2 [  ";  "] are computed as follows: "
k;k
2 () makes Player 2 precisely indierent over all
histories h that are consistent with b sk
2, conditional on the true column being k; "
k;k0
2 () makes
Player 2 precisely indierent over all histories h that are consistent with b sk
2, conditional on the
true column being k0, while "
k;k0
1 (h) compensates Player 1 for every period along h in which
the action he took is the action specied by s
jk
1 , so as to make sure that playing this action is
optimal, conditional on the true state being (j;k0) (reported in the last c periods).




During periods n   c + 1,..., n of the phase,




































From a punishment phase: Without loss of generality, consider P1. We have already brie
y









, if Player i unilaterally deviates from the play of U, the punishment
phase Pi is immediately entered; in case k, if Player 2 deviates from the support of the (possibly
mixed) action specied by b sk
2, punishment phase P2 is entered (no matter how Player 1 has
played). From now on, we assume without repeating it that no such deviation occurs up to
period T   c. In case k, let h denote the history during the periods c + 1;:::;T   c.
25(i) In case k:
Punishment Phase P1:
During periods T   c + 1,..., T of the phase,




























case k j;k Rjk

nU





























During periods T   c + 1,..., T of the phase,






























































It is clear from this specication that the strategy prole described here is belief-free, since
actions are always determined by the history and possibly by a player's own type (in case he is
minmaxed), but not on his beliefs about his opponent's type.
Specication of  ", a
jk
1 ("1;"2), , T, n; ~ "
jk
i :
Since v is in the interior of V , it is possible to nd  " > 0, as well as, for all ("1;"2);("0
1;"0
2) 2
[ 2 ";2 "], probability distributions over A, Prf j Rjk ("1;"2)g such that for all j;k;j0;k0, and


















































t=1 are the sequences corresponding to reports j and k, for all  close
enough to one and n large enough, we can pick those distributions so that Player i's average




t=1 followed by n c repetitions of
the action prole determined by Prfa j Rjk ("1;"2)g is exactly equal to v
jk
i +"i. Observe that in
the equilibrium described above, all values of "i are in [  ";  "]. Further, since v is in the interior
of V , we may assume that Player 1's (resp. Player 2's) average discounted payo under state
(j;k) given that Player 2 uses b sk
2 (") (resp. b s
j
1 (")) for n   2c periods, followed by any arbitrary
play during c periods, is at most v
jk
1 + " (resp. v
jk
2 + "), for " >  3 ".
Consider the following inequalities:
v
jk
1 + "1 > (1   
c)M + 
c (1   
n)(v   2 ") + 
n+c(v
jk
1 + ~ "
jk
1 + c); (2A)
v
jk



















1   2 ") + 
n(v
jk
1    "): (4A)
Given  ", xing n, inequality (4A) is satised as  ! 1, provided that the value of n is large
enough. Similarly, given  ", xing n, inequality (2A) is satised as  ! 1 for ~ "
jk
1 =   ", and (3A)
is satised for ~ "
jk
1 = 3 "=4, provided that the value of n is large enough and "1 <  "=2 (recall that
 = 2(1   ) max(n;T)M ! 0 for xed  max(n;T)). Observe that the left-hand side of (4A) is
the lowest possible payo for Player 1, evaluated in the rst period of a communication round
concluding either a punishment phase or a regular phase, if he reports his true row j and Player
2 reports his true column k, while the right-hand side is the most he can expect by reporting
another row j0 6= j when Player 2 reports his true column k. Similarly, the left-hand side of (2A)
and (3A) is Player 1's payo, evaluated in the rst period of a communication round concluding
either a punishment phase or a regular phase, if he reports his true row j and Player 2 reports
his true column k (and the upcoming regular phase is Rjk ("1;"2)), while the right-hand side of







1 . Therefore, if "1 <  "=2, by the intermediate value theorem, we can nd dierent values of
~ "
jk





1 , which in turn exceeds the payo from reporting another row j0 6= j, provided
Player 2 reports the true column. If "1   "=2, we can set ~ "
jk
1 = 0: in that case as well, the






















1    "): (6A)






2 : the left-hand side of (5A) is the lowest
possible payo for Player 1, evaluated in the rst period of a communication round concluding
either a punishment phase or a regular phase, if he reports his true row j, while the right-hand






1 ; similarly, the left-hand side
of (6A) is the lowest possible payo for Player 1, evaluated in the rst period of a communication







1 , while the right-hand side is the highest payo he can get if he reports another row j0 6= j.
Observe that both inequalities hold, given  ", letting  ! 1, provided n is large enough.







1 , Player 1 has strict incentives to play U in all remaining periods
of the communication round, no matter where this round takes place.
Similar considerations hold for Player 2. To summarize, we have shown that we can ensure











i , Player i has strict incen-







i than to report an incorrect row or column; all this, provided that n
(and T) is xed but large enough, by taking  ! 1, given  ".










i   2 ") + 
T+1(v
jk














i   2 ") + 
T+1(v
jk






















i    "=4): (9A)
Observe that all three inequalities hold, for both i = 1;2, given  ", for T and n xed, as  ! 1.
This ensures that, given  ", we can choose n, T,  to satisfy all the inequalities above. As for the
interpretation, (7A) ensures that Player i does not want to deviate during any regular phase;
(8A) that Player i does not want to deviate during the punishment phase P i and (9A) ensures
that we can pick "
k;k
2 () and "
k;k0
2 () within a range of values not exceeding  "=4 in case k and after
phases R(L;nu
1);k and Rj;(L;nu
2). Indeed, the left-hand side of (7A) and (8A) is the highest payo
Player i can hope for by deviating at any time (outside communication rounds), while the right-
hand side of (7A) (resp. (8A)) is the lowest payo he can expect by sticking to the equilibrium
strategies in a regular phase (resp. in a punishment phase). Note that
 
1   T
M is the highest
payo Player 1 (resp. Player 2) can get whe unsign stratgey b s
j
1(resp.b sk
2) during the punishment









whose ranges do not exceed  "=4 such that Player 1 is playing a best-reply, given "
k;k0
1 (), whether
or not the true column is k.
To conclude, it remains to show that the public randomization can be dispensed with. Observe




t=1 is the sequence of action proles corresponding to the reports (j;k), and for all 
close enough to 1, the public randomization device guarantees that we can nd a correlated




n   c repetitions of this correlated action prole yields a payo v
jk
i + "i to Player i, in state
(j;k). Observe now that all incentives in the regular phase are strict, so that they would also
be satised, for all  close enough to one, as long as the continuation payo ^ vt
i in period t of the
regular phase is within 2 "+^ " (rather than within 2 ") of v
jk
i , for some ^ " > 0 suciently small and
all t = 1;:::;n. Observe now that, following Fudenberg and Maskin (1991) [which itself builds
on Sorin (1986)], we can nd n large enough, so that, for all  close enough to 1, there exists













t=1 for all ,

















obtained by concatenation of the elements of this sequence, is equal to v
jk
i + "i, and that (ii)
the continuation payo from any period t onward in this innite play, is within ^ " of v
jk
i + "i.2
It is then clear how to modify the specication above: increase n and choose  close to one, if
necessary, to guarantee the existence of such sequences; if players are in the v-th consecutive
regular phase Rjk ("1;"2), with reports (j;k) that agreed in all those phases, play in that v-th




t=1 (note that, in general, the continuation payo of i at the
beginning of the v-th phase is not exactly v
jk
i + "i, so ("1;"2) only refers to the continuation
payo achieved in the rst such regular phase, or more precisely, from the communication phase
that immediately precedes this rst regular phase onward). If a deviation occurs, or consecutive






v=1 starts in the
next regular phase (or more precisely, from the communication phase that immediately precedes
this rst regular phase), given the new values of ("1;"2).
Appendix 2: Individual Rationality in the Leading Example
To prove the result, we need to introduce some notations. For 2 2 4A2 (viewed henceforth
















1(1;2) is Player 1's expected payo in the stage game when players randomize their
actions according to (1;2) and the true row, or state, is j. Thus, U (2) represents the set of
expected payo vectors that Player 1 can obtain in the two states, given that Player 2 randomizes
his action according to 2 as we vary Player 1's mixed action 1 (but independent of the row j).
2The construction of Sorin (1986) and Fudenberg and Maskin (1991) guarantees that n and  can be chosen
independently of vjk + ".
29Note 1 and 2 do not depend on j. Let F  R2 be a compact set. For all x = 2 F, let F(x)
denote the set of points in F closest to x. If x and y are two distinct points of R2, Hxy is the
line through y perpendicular to the line xy. Blackwell (1968) shows that if F is a closed convex
set, F is approachable (for Player 2) if and only if it is a B-set: F is a B-set if for all x = 2 F,
there exists a mixed action 2 for Player 2 and a point y in F(x) such that the hyperplane Hxy
separates x from U(2).
Assume from now on that F = fx 2 Rj : xj  v
j
1 for all j = 1;2g and let (v1
1;v2
1) =: v.
Consider rst the case G < L. See Figure 1A. If v lies (weakly) below the segments D1 (see
Figure 1A), then it is always possible to nd x = 2 F such that F(x) = v and Hxv is parallel to
D1. Since for all 2, U(2) \ D1 is non-empty, [in fact, D1 and D2 represent the set of extreme
points of U(2)] there is no 2 such that the line Hxv separates x from U(2). Hence F is not a
B-set. Similarly, if v lies (weakly) below one of the segments D2 or it has a negative coordinate,
F is not approachable as it is always possible to nd a point x = 2 F such that F(x) = v and
Hxv does not separate D1 or D2 from x. Suppose now that v lies above both segments D1 and
D2 and has strictly positive coordinates. Then all points outside F can be separated from U(0),
U(1) or U(1=2) (see Figure 1A). It is straightforward to check that the segments D1 and D2 are



















for the appropriate ranges of values v1
1 and v2
1, giving the desired result.
Consider now the case G > L. See Figure 2A. The curve C represents the sets of payos
(v1
1;v2
1) such that v2
1 equals the right hand side of (1). This region corresponds to the set
of maximal payos that Player 1 can achieve in a one-shot game in which players use mixed















1 2 [ L;1+G]. Hence there is no 2 such that U(2) has a point that lies strictly above
C. Moreover, for any 2, U (2) intersects C in one point since the value of 2 that solves the
maximization problem varies between 0 and 1 as v1
1 varies from  L to (1+G). If v lies (weakly)
below the curve C then it is always possible to nd x = 2 F that lies above C such that F(x) = v
and Hxv lies (weakly) below C. Since for all 2, U(2) \ C is non-empty, there is no 2 such
that the line Hxv separates x from U(2). Consider now v above the curve C and such that v
has strictly positive coordinates. Then all points outside F can be separated from U(0), U(1) or
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